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Abstract
Many countries are ethnically diverse. However, despite the benefits of ethnic het-
erogeneity, ethnic-based political inequality and discrimination are pervasive. Why is
this? This study suggests that part of the variation in ethnic-based political inequality
depends on the relative size of ethnic groups within each country. Using group-level
data for 569 ethnic groups in 175 countries from 1946 to 2017, I find evidence of an
inverted-U-shaped relationship between an ethnic group’s relative size and its access
to power. This single-peaked relationship is robust to many alternative specifications,
and a battery of robustness checks suggests that relative size influences access to power.
Through a very simple model, I propose an explanation based on an initial high level of
political inequality, and on the incentives that more powerful groups have to continue
limiting other groupsâĂŹ access to power. This explanation incorporates essential
elements of several existing theories on the relationship between group size and dis-
crimination, and suggests a new empirical prediction: the single-peaked pattern should
be weaker in countries where political institutions have historically been less open. This
additional prediction is supported by the data.
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1 Introduction
Many countries are ethnically diverse, regardless of their level of development.1 Despite
the benefits of ethnic heterogeneity,2 ethnic-based political inequality and discrimination are
pervasive.3 Why is this? This study suggests that part of the variation in ethnic-based
political inequality depends of the relative size of ethnic groups within a country.
Using group-level data for 569 ethnic groups in 175 countries from 1946 to 2017, I find
evidence of an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the relative size of an ethnic group
and its access to power. This single-peaked relationship is robust to many alternative specifi-
cations, which include group fixed effects, time-varying group-specific controls, country-time
fixed effects and group-specific linear trends. This relationship is also robust to using lagged
relative group size as an instrument for its current value.
Though caution is necessary in interpreting the results as causal, they are consistent
with relative group size affecting access to power. Taking this into consideration, I propose
an explanation based on an initial high level of political inequality, and on the incentives
that more powerful groups have, ex ante, to continue limiting other groups’ access to power.
Through a very simple model, I argue that these incentives crucially depend on the relative
size of politically marginalized groups, and follow an inverted-U-shaped pattern. First, when
a politically marginalized group is very small, the group tends to be irrelevant, so more
powerful groups have little incentive to cede any control to this small group. Second, when
a politically marginalized group is relatively large, individuals in very powerful — but also
relatively small — groups greatly value a government controlled by their own group, as it
allows them to extract very high per capita rents. Therefore, individuals in small powerful
groups do not have incentives to share power because it would limit their ability to keep
rents for themselves. Only when a politically excluded group is neither very big nor very
small can it expect to receive greater access to power; the excluded group is big enough to
potentially overthrow the government if it isn’t voluntarily given access to power, but small
enough that it wouldn’t detract too much from the incumbent group’s ability to extract rents
in a power-sharing arrangement.
1See Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003), who propose time-invariant measures of ethnic diversity
that are widely used in the literature, and report relatively high levels of ethnic fractionalization by country
(as well as significant cross-country variation). For alternative — time-variant — measures, see Patsiurko
et al. (2012), who show that even the most historically homogenous countries (i.e. the OECD countries) are
rapidly becoming more heterogeneous. In addition, see Vogt et al. (2015), who propose the Ethnic Power
Relations (EPR) Core Dataset, a very rich dataset that is extensively used in this paper.
2One example is increased productivity, as ethnic diversity may be associated with more trade and
innovation. However, ethnic diversity is also associated with negative outcomes, particularly lower levels
of generalized trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) and an underprovision of public goods (Alesina et al.,
1999). See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a review of the possible costs and benefits of ethnic diversity,
and Laitin and Jeon (2015) for a longer list of the potential benefits of ethnic diversity.
3From 1946 to 2017, at least 32% of ethnic groups were explicitly politically discriminated against at
some point (see EPR Core Dataset). Group discrimination issues have also been on the agenda of the
United Nations for many years (for example, see Resolution 47/135 of Dec. 18, 1992) and, specifically, it has
been argued that it is not sufficient for states to siimply ensure formal political participation for minority
groups, but that this political participation must have a substantial influence on decisions that are taken
(see OHCHR Forum on Minority Issues, 2009).
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The model I propose to explain the inverted-U relationship between group size and access
to power leads to a new empirical prediction that identifies a crucial role of the persistence of
political institutions: the single-peaked pattern should be weaker in countries where political
institutions have historically been less open. Insofar as undemocratic institutions tend to
persist, in countries with political institutions that have traditionally been less open, any
increase in the de jure access to power of politically marginalized groups might be seen as less
threatening by more powerful groups. Thus, insofar as the costs of maintaining the status quo
increase with the size of marginalized groups, in countries where political institutions have
historically been less open, the model predicts a monotonically increasing relation between
group size and access to power.
Using PolityIV’s measures of openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment as a
proxy for the openness of political institutions, I find evidence consistent with this additional
prediction: the inverted-U relationship between group size and access to power is specific to
countries where political institutions have been more open in the past; in countries with less
open political institutions, this relationship tends to be monotonically increasing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature on
the relationship between political exclusion and group size. The data and empirical strategy
are discussed in Section 3. The main results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the model, and Section 6 provides additional evidence related to the role of the persistence
of political institutions. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
The sociology and economics literatures have developed distinct approaches to examin-
ing the relationship between group discrimination and group size. The classical sociological
approach identifies the size of the groups as a crucial factor in explaining how individuals in
dominant groups perceive potential threats posed by individuals in other groups. This liter-
ature has proposed two hypotheses about the specific relationship between this perception
and the size of the subordinate groups. First, it may be that the larger the size of a subor-
dinate group, the more individuals in a dominant group perceive the subordinate group as a
threat to their economic and social privileges and, therefore, the higher their motivation to
discriminate against the subordinate group (see for instance Blumer 1958 or Blalock 1967).4
Second, it may be that the larger the relative size of a subordinate group, the greater the
opportunity for positive intergroup contact, which reduces the motivation for individuals in
the dominant group to discriminate against individuals in the subordinate group (see for
instance Allport 1954 or Pettigrew 1998).5 The empirical evidence for these two theories is
inconclusive (see Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) for a critical review), with problems related
to identification and external validity.
The economics literature relating discrimination and group size is less abundant, and fo-
cuses on discrimination in labor markets and segregation. Departing from a standard model
of statistical discrimination in labor markets, Moro and Norman (2004) propose a theoretical
4This idea constitutes the core of what is known as the “power-threat” or “group threat” theory.
5This idea constitutes the core of what in known as the “intergroup contact” theory.
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extension that examines how group size affects conflicting interests between groups. Specifi-
cally, they find that as the marginalized group grows, the per capita gains from discrimination
for individuals in the dominant group also grow, as do the incentives of individuals in the
subordinate group to invest in human capital. This makes it harder to sustain a discrimina-
tory equilibrium, and suggests one rationale for apartheid or other discriminatory measures;
however, Moro and Norman (2004) do not model this explicitly.
Eeckhout (2006) proposes a model of segregation in which segregation can make minority
groups worse off while making the majority better off, so that any change in equilibrium
that eliminates segregation will make the majority worse off. Even though it is not explicitly
modeled, Eeckhout’s main result is consistent with Moro and Norman’s rationale for the
existence of institutional devices to ensure that the preferred equilibrium for the group with
political control is realized.
This paper seeks to contribute to the sociological literature by providing new and rela-
tively well-identified evidence about the relationship between group discrimination and group
size, with a specific focus on the access to power of individuals in subordinate groups (rather
than on out-group attitudes). In addition, this paper proposes a new and very stylized micro-
funded theory that allows for the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship. This paper
seeks to contribute to the economics literature by providing evidence about the relationship
between group discrimination and group size, and on the role of institutional mechanisms
that affect this relationship.
3 Empirical specification and identification
3.1 Data
I study 569 ethnic groups in 175 countries from 1946 to 2017. The baseline specification
is divided into 10-year sub-periods (starting in 1945) to account for potential lags in the
relationship between group size and group access to state power.6 To construct observations
for each sub-period, I take an average of the annual data from that sub-period.7
The analysis is based on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Core Dataset 2018, which
identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country
of the world from 1946 to 2017 (Vogt et al., 2015).8 It provides annual data on politically
relevant ethnic groups,9 their relative sizes as a share of the total population, and their access
to executive state power in all countries with a population of at least 250,000.10
6I also construct a five-year panel, which achieves similar results.
7I explore robustness to an alternative specification in which, instead of averaging the 10-year data, I take
one year’s observation from within each sub-period (i.e. one observation every tenth year). The motivation
behind this robustness check is the additional serial correlation that averaging may introduce. As will be
shown below, the results are robust to the use of this alternative specification.
8This data can be found at https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core/.
9The EPR dataset defines “ethnicity” as a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief
of common ancestry and a shared culture. It includes ethnolinguistic, ethnoreligious, and ethnosomatic (or
“racial”) groups.
10For a more detailed description of this dataset, see Besley and Mueller (2018), who also use this dataset.
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The EPR dataset characterizes an ethnic group as politically relevant if at least one sig-
nificant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political
arena, or if group members are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in
public politics. The EPR measures access to power with a roughly ordinal scale composed
of three main categories (and several subcategories), depending on whether a group controls
power alone, shares power with other ethnic groups, or is excluded from executive state
power. Specifically, the EPR measures power access according to the following categories
and subcategories:
1 The group rules alone:
1.1 Monopoly – Members hold monopoly power in the executive.
1.2 Dominance – Members hold dominant power in the executive.
2 The group shares central power:
2.1 Senior partner – Members participate as senior partners in a formal or informal
power-sharing arrangement.
2.2 Junior partner – Members participate as junior partners in government.
3 The group is excluded from central power:
3.1 Powerless – Members do not have influence on decision-making at the national
level of executive power, but are not explicitly discriminated against.
3.2 Discrimination – Members are subjected to active, intentional and targeted dis-
crimination by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power.
3.3 Self-exclusion (or separatist autonomy) – Members have excluded themselves from
central state power.
3.4 Irrelevance – Members’ ethnicity is not politicized (but the members comprise a
sufficiently large group).
Although these categories are qualitative, they have a clear hierarchy: “monopoly” means
more access to power than “dominance,” which is better than sharing power. For groups
that are excluded, being powerless plausibly implies having more access to power than being
irrelevant or self-excluded, and the worst scenario is likely discrimination.11 I exploit this
implicit order to construct a scale of access to power from 0 to 5.12
11The ERC dataset does not provide reasons why a group is irrelevant, so a group may become irrelevant
after being heavily discriminated against. Thus, there is a case to be made that irrelevance is worse than
discrimination. In addition, it is not clear whether self-exclusion is better (or worse) than irrelevance. I
discuss these issues in more detail below.
12In this sample, the average index of access to central power is 1.545 (and the standard deviation is 1.216).
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Table I
EPR classification Access to power score
Monopoly 5
Dominance 4
Senior partner 3
Junior partner 2
Powerless/Irrelevance/Self-exclusion 1
Discrimination 0
The index in Table I relies on two main assumptions. First, groups that are discrimi-
nated against have less access to central power than groups that are irrelevant, powerless
or self-excluded. The justification for this assumption is that being explicitly discriminated
against implies greater costs — for accessing power — than being powerless, irrelevant or
self-excluded. Second, groups that are powerless, irrelevant or self-excluded have the same
(low) level of access to central power. The justification for this assumption is based on the
notion of irrelevance: if a group is self-excluded or powerless, dominant groups will likely
expect that the other group’s members will be unable to gain access to central power.13
The other main dataset used in the paper is the Polity IV dataset, which evaluates the
openness and competitiveness of countries’ political institutions. Specifically, I use Polity IV’s
“Openness of Executive Recruitment” and “Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment” to
measure how politically open and competitive a country’s institutions are in a given year (or
decade).14
3.2 Empirical Strategy and Identification
As previously mentioned, there is no consensus among scholars about the relationship
between group size and access to power. My empirical analysis allows for the possibility of
either a negative or positive relationship.
In the main specification, I model the outcome ygct (my index of access to central power
based on the EPR power access characterization)15 of group g in country i and 10-year period
t as
access to powergct = α + β1 × sizegct + β2 × size2gct + γct + ηg + gct (1)
where sizegct is the relative size of g in country i and period t, size2gct is the square of
this size, γct are country/period fixed effects, ηg are group fixed effects and gct is the error
term. In some specifications, I also add group-specific linear trends, and control for the
13However, since these two assumptions may be still seen as ad hoc, I explore robustness to the use of an
alternative measure that relies on the possibility of being part of a government (e.g. as a junior partner).
The main results are robust to the use of a dichotomous measure of access to central power, which is equal
to 1 if the group is not excluded and 0 if it is excluded. In addition, the results are robust to dropping all
the groups with an irrelevant level of access to power.
14See Section 6 for a description of how I code these measures.
15In the baseline specification, the analysis is limited to groups that are not dominant, i.e. that don’t have
monopoly power or are not a senior partner (i.e. groups with an access to power score of 2 or less in Table
I).
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presence of each group in other countries (which varies at the group × 10-year level). The
two coefficients of interest are β1 and β2, which are associated with the relative size of the
groups; β2 is introduced to allow for a nonlinear relationship.
With respect to identification, since the baseline specification (1) includes country/period
fixed effects, it controls for any omitted variable varying at the country × 10-year level.16
In addition, the inclusion of group-specific linear trends helps control for any omitted linear
trend that varies at the group level. Finally, note that the control for the presence of each
group in other countries accounts for a potentially omitted (and crucial) channel: a group
may have less (or more) access to central power because its members were (or haven’t been)
forced to migrate to other countries, and this migration (or lack of it) may also explain the
small (or large) group size.
Simultaneity is also a concern in (1) if, for instance, groups with less access to power have
lower fertility rates. To address this, I first replace the explanatory variables (group size and
the square of group size) with their lagged values. Second, I instrument group size (and the
square of group size) with a lagged group size (and a lag of the squared group size). As long
as the lagged values for group size do not themselves exert a direct effect on power access,
this second alternative specification provides an effective estimation strategy.
Even though I recognize that fixed effects regressions (such as (1)) cannot necessarily esti-
mate the causal effect of group size on power access (e.g. there may be still omitted variables
varying non-linearly at the group × period level that are weakly correlated with a group’s
presence in other countries),17 the results are robust to many alternative specifications, which
significantly alleviates these concerns.
4 Baseline empirical results
Figure I shows, for each non-dominant minority group in each 10-year period, the corre-
lation between the group’s access to power score and the relative size of the group (i.e. the
group’s membership as a proportion of the country’s population). It shows a clear inverted-U
shape.
Table II reports the estimated coefficients for variations of the model in Eq. (1). The
specification in column (1) does not include any controls or fixed effects, and corresponds
to the specification used in Figure I. Column (2) includes country and 10-year-period fixed
effects, and column (3) adds country/10-year period fixed effects. Columns (4) and (5)
include group fixed effects and group-specific linear trends. In all the specifications in Table
II, the estimated coefficients for β1 are positive, the coefficients for β2 are negative, and all
are individually and jointly significant. In addition, the peak is located at 0.47, which lies
16As previously mentioned, all the results are robust to using five-year panel, which includes country/5-year
period fixed effects.
17One example may be the level of cohesiveness of the groups, or, more specifically, the level of trust of
individuals within these groups. However, it can be argued that although this level changes over time, it does
so only over long periods (in this respect see for instance Algan and Cahuc, 2010, who show that inherited
trust is strongly persistent).
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comfortably within the range of values for relative group size (i.e, between 0 and 1).18 Thus,
these results confirms the inverted-U shape in Figure I.
I also provide results for several additional specifications to verify the robustness of the
results in Table II. First, instead of averaging annual results over a 10-year period, I use one
observation from within each 10-year period (e.g one observation every tenth year). These
estimates are shown in Panel A of Table III. Second, instead of using 10-year periods, I
use a five-year panel. These estimates are shown in Panel B of Table III. Third, instead of
the continuous measure for access to state power, I use a dichotomous measure of access to
power that is equal to 1 if a group is not excluded from central power and 0 if it is excluded.
These estimates are shown in Panel C of Table III. In all three additional specifications, the
results from Table II hold, i.e. all specifications show a clear inverted-U-shaped relationship
between the relative size of a group and its level of access to central power.
In interpreting causality, we must be cautious of reverse causality bias: a group’s access
to power may affect its relative size (e.g. groups that are discriminated against may migrate
to other countries and/or have lower fertility rates). In addition, groups that differ in relative
size might also differ in other unobserved and non-linearly time-varying characteristics that
affect their access to central power (e.g. members of large groups may receive support from
exiles in other countries, and this may improve their chances to gaining access to central
power). If this is the case, the previous results may be affected by omitted-variable bias.
Table IV addresses these potential issues. Columns (1) to (3) of panel A consider spec-
ifications that use lagged values of group size as an independent variable instead of current
group size. Columns (4) and (5) of panel A consider specifications that use the lagged val-
ues of relative group size as instruments for the contemporaneous values. Under certain
conditions, these two strategies help to avoid the inconsistency problems associated with
simultaneity (see Reed, 2015). All the estimates are virtually the same as those in Table II,
which indicates that simultaneity is likely not a problem.
Omitted-variable bias may be less worrisome given the different fixed effects included in
the baseline specifications. In addition, the specifications in panel B of Table IV add one
crucial covariate: the presence of members of the same group in other countries. All the
estimates remain the same whether we consider contemporaneous values for the relative size
(columns (1) to (3)), lagged values (column (4)), or lagged values as instruments for the
contemporaneous values (column (5)).
While one must be cautious in claiming that the estimates in Tables II to IV are caused
by purely exogenous shocks, the fact that the results in Table II are robust to all the speci-
fications in Table IV guards against the most obvious forms of endogeneity.
5 Explaining the inverted U: A simple model
In this section, I propose an explanation of the single-peaked relationship between access
to central power and relative group size. I use a very simple stylized model in which one
group, with an ex ante monopoly of political power, decides whether to continue limiting
other groups’ access to central power.
18More specifically, the value 0.47 falls between the 75th and 85th percentiles of relative size.
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5.1 Set-up
Consider a society composed of individuals who belong to n internally homogenous
groups. Let N be the total number of individuals in the society, with Ni representing the
number of individuals in group i, so that ∑ni=1Ni = N . There are two time periods, each with
a government that may be controlled by a single group or by several groups. Assume that
in the first period, one group (or a cluster of groups) fully controls the government and de-
cides whether or not to continue limiting other groups’ access to power in the second period.
Without loss of generality, we set n = 2, and assume that group 1 has an ex ante monopoly
over political power in period 1. Group 2 can be interpreted as a cluster of groups with
limited access to power in period 1; de jure, this group is totally excluded from government
decisions in period 1 (and potentially in period 2). If group 2’s access to power in period
2 is not restricted, both group 1 and group 2 will participate in the period-2 government.
Crucially, I assume that if group 2’s access to power in period 2 is not de jure limited, its level
of control over the period-2 government will be proportional to its share of the population.
Specifically, let si denote group i’s level of control over the period-2 government, and assume
that19
si =
Ni∑2
j=1Nj
. (2)
As previously mentioned, the analysis focuses on group 1’s decision about whether or not to,
de jure, limit group’s 2 access to power in period 2. This decision depends on the benefits that
individuals in group 1 obtain from a government fully or partially controlled by their own
group. Specifically, I assume that the government has an exogenously determined budget
that it divides and transfers to individuals using the following approach. First, each group
that participates in the government receives an allocation of the budget proportional to that
group’s level of control of the government. Second, the budgetary allocation for that group is
divided equally among the group’s members. In other words, if group i has monopoly control
of the government, and if the per capita value of the government budget is normalized to
unity, then each member of this group will receive N/Ni.20
Individuals use their government transfer to purchase a private good in period 2, from
which they derive utility that increases linearly in their consumption of the private good.21
19This would correspond to an electoral system with perfectly proportional representation; in this scenario,
si could represent the number of seats in the national parliament for a political party that represents group
i. Note that (2) assumes that when group 2 has access to power, its level of control over the government
depends only on its relative size. This is a strong assumption, as one might expect that group 1 could use its
control of the government in period 1 to de facto limit group 2’s level of control in period 2 (e.g. by passing
constitutional measures that restrict the extent of political reforms that the government can pass in period
2). More generally, this assumption implies that a country can easily transition from having a very closed
political system to having a very open system, which may not be realistic. In the next subsection, I relax
this assumption and obtain new predictions.
20The model can be generalized to allow part of the budget to be allocated toward public goods that
benefit all groups. In this alternative scenario, we could weight the two different categories of expenditures,
and the share that is allocated to public goods could be interpreted as an indicator of the importance of the
public good payoff relative to the “monetary” payoff. All results are robust to this extension.
21Alternatively, if we include the possibility of public goods, and if group’s 2 access to power is not limited,
we could define αi as the utility that a member of group 1 derives from the public good if a single unit per
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More precisely, we define the overall payoff to an individual in group 1 when group’s 2 access
to power is not restricted as
s1(N/N1). (3)
When group 1 decides to restrict group’s 2 access to power, I assume that group 2 attempts to
overthrow group 1’s government, which results in a costly contest between the two groups.
The group that wins this contest fully controls the government in period 2. The success
of each group depends on its relative size and on its capacity to coordinate its actions.
Specifically, I assume the following contest function:
pi =
Ni + ai∑2
j=1(Nj + aj)
(4)
where ai ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2 is a parameter that captures how sensitive a group’s probability of
success is to the group’s relative population. This can be interpreted as the ability of each
group to solve the collective-action problem.22
I model the costs of the conflict as follows. I assume that a fraction of the government
budget is destroyed due to violence, and only the reminder can be divided among the mem-
bers of the winning group. The fraction of the budget that is destroyed is assumed to be
proportional to the relative size of group 2, since the bigger the group without political
rights, the greater its capacity to cause turbulence and destruction. I therefore summarize
the overall payoff to an individual in group 1 when group’s 2 access to power is limited as
pi(N/N1)(1− λ(N2/N)) (5)
where λ(N2/N) is the fraction of the government budget that is destroyed, and λ ∈ (0, 1)
is a parameter that captures the marginal increase in the level of destruction as the relative
size of group 2 increases.23
Finally, I make two assumptions about the parameters λ, a1 and a2. First, I assume
that a1 > a2, and normalize a2 = 0, with which a1 > 0. As discussed in footnote 22, this
implies that the de facto power of group 1 in period 2 is greater than that of group 2. This
assumption can be justified by the fact that group 1 had the monopoly of power in period
1, so it is plausible that this group, in period 2, has more resources to invest in increasing
its de facto political power.24
Second, I assume that
λ/(1− λ) > a1. (6)
capita of the optimal mix for group i is produced (using the private good as numeraire). Then, the per capita
payoff to group 1 could be written as α1 + (N/N1) if group 1 fully controls the government in period 2, and
α2 if group 2 fully controls the government in period 2. Note that it must be the case that α1 ≥ α2. As
previously mentioned, the results are robust to this extension.
22Specifically, ai can be understood as the de facto capacity of individuals in group 2 to coordinate their
actions to overthrow the existing regime, or the capacity of individuals in group 1 to repress group 2. This
assumption helps to simply correct an undesirable feature of Tullock’s success function (see Hirshleifer, 1989;
Blavatskyy, 2010; Corchon and Dahm, 2010; Jia, 2012).
23The main results hold if the proportion of the government budget that is destroyed also depends on a2.
However, to simplify the exposition, I assume that λ only depends on group size.
24Even though the model assumes de facto power is exogenous, this assumption is consistent with some
literature that endogenizes de facto power (e.g. see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).
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By implying that the costs of conflict are sufficiently high and that the de facto power of
group 1 is sufficiently low, this second assumption basically guarantees that limiting group
2’s access to power is not a dominant strategy for group 1.
5.2 Equilibrium
The main objective of this section is to propose an explanation for the empirical relation-
ship between access to power and relative size found in Section 4. This section examines the
conditions under which individuals in group 1 decide whether to limit group 2’s access to
power in period 2 and, specifically, how those conditions depend on the relative size of the
two groups.
From the previous analysis, it is clear that group 1 will not give group 2 access to power
in period 2 when the expression in (5) is greater than the expression in (3), i.e. when
pi(N/N1)(1− λ(N2/N)) ≥ s1(N/N1). (7)
To facilitate the exposition and interpretation of the results, I normalize the population to 1
(i.e. N = 1), and define δ as the relative size of group 2 (so N1 = 1− δ and N2 = δ). Thus,
replacing the expressions for si and pi in (7) and rearranging, it is easy to see that (7) is
equivalent to
(1− δ + a1)
(1 + a1)
(1− λδ)
(1− δ) − 1 ≥ 0. (8)
The expression in (8) constitutes the main finding of this section. Importantly, it entails
an inverted-U relationship between group 2’s relative size (i.e. δ) and its access to central
power. This result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Consider the above-described game. In equilibrium, the relationship between
access to central power for a group with an ex ante limited access and its relative size (δ)
follows an inverted-U pattern: this group’s access to central power is expected to be lower for
smaller and larger values of δ, and higher for intermediate values of δ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The inverted-U shape can be explained as follows. First, when the relative size of group 2
is very small, individuals in group 1 have few incentives to increase group 2’s access to power
because the cost of maintaining the status quo, which benefits group 1, is small: the ensuing
contest with group 2 is expected to be minimally destructive and group 1’s chance of success
is very high. As the relative size of group 2 increases, a contest becomes more destructive,
so the period-2 budget associated with this scenario is reduced; this gives individuals in
group 1 an incentive to increase group 2’s access to power.25 Finally, when the relative
size of group 2 is very big, this means group 1 is relatively very small, which implies that
individuals in group 1 greatly value a government fully controlled by their group (because
25Provided that the size of group 1 is not very small so that the budget in the contest scenario would be
divided among a still large number of individuals, and that the effect of the bias in favor of group 1 in the
contest success function is still small.
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the per capita transfers they receive are very large). In these circumstances, individuals in
group 1 have few incentives to increase group 2’s access to power, even though this implies
that the government will have a significantly reduced budget in period 2 (which is mitigated
somewhat by a contest function that is biased in favor of group 1).
Importantly, note that the U-shaped relationship described in Prop. 1 is consistent with
the empirical evidence in Section 3. In particular, it rationalizes the results in Figure I and
Columns (1) to (6) in Table II. It is also important to note that even though the explanation I
propose is new, it is consistent with the main predictions of the existing theoretical literature
on group discrimination. Specifically, it is consistent with the idea that the smaller a minority,
the more it suffers (Eeckhout, 2006), and the larger a minority, the more likely the coercive
measures against it (Moro and Norman, 2004), and the greater the antipathy felt towards
it (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967; Oliver and Wong, 2003). One of the contributions of this
paper is to propose a very simple mechanism that explains (and tests) both predictions.
5.3 Persistence of political institutions
In the last subsection it was assumed that if group 2 is given access to power in period
2, its level of power will be proportional to its size. As mentioned in footnote 19, this means
that the institutions that affect group 2’s access to political power can transition from being
completely closed to being completely open. In this subsection, I remove this assumption
to allow for the possibility that institutions in period 2 are biased in favor of group 1 even
if group 2’s access to power is not limited. The motivation behind this extension is based
on the idea that institutions tend to persist for long periods (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002;
Banerjee and Iyer, 2005).
Specifically, I assume that when group 2’s access to power is not de jure limited, the
participation of group 2 in the period-2 government is given by
q2 = γs2 (9)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that measures how unbiased political institutions are expected
to be in period 2. Since period-1 political institutions are assumed to be very biased in favor
group 1, γ can be understood as the inverse of how persistent institutions are.
From (9), note that since q1 = 1 − q2, we have that q1 = γs1 + 1 − γ. From these
expressions, note that when γ = 1, qi = si for i = 1, 2, which corresponds to the scenario
examined in the last subsection. Importantly, note that q1 ≥ s1, q2 ≤ s2, and that as γ
decreases q1 increases, meaning that group 1’s level of control in the period-2 government
can be disproportionally larger despite the fact that group 2’s access to power is not de jure
limited.
Replacing q2 in (8) and rearranging, it is easy to see that we have
(1− δ + a1)
(1 + a1)
(1− λδ)
(1− δ) −
(1− γδ)
(1− δ) ≥ 0. (10)
By analyzing (10), the following proposition summarizes how the results in Prop. 1 change
when institutions in period 2 are expected to be biased in favor of group 1, even though both
groups have access to power.
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Proposition 2. Consider the above-described game. In equilibrium, if political institutions
are sufficiently persistent, then the relationship between a group’s access to central power
and its relative size does not follow an inverted-U pattern and, more specifically, the larger
a group’s relative size, the more likely it will have access to power.
Proof. See the Appendix
The intuition behind Prop. 2 is straightforward: the more biased institutions are ex-
pected to be in favor of group 1, the less costly it is for group 1 to give group 2 access to
power, particularly when group 2 is relatively large. In addition, and importantly, Prop. 2
establishes a new empirical prediction: the inverted-U relationship between relative size and
access to power crucially depends on the historical quality of institutions; for historically
closed political institutions, it is more likely that this relationship, if existent, is positive
(rather than non-monotonic). In the next section I examine the empirical plausibility of this
new prediction.
6 Additional evidence
This section empirically examines whether the results in Section 4 depend on the his-
torical level of openness of the political institutions, as predicted in Section 5. To measure
the openness of political institutions, I use two proxies from PolityIV. First, I use a variable
called “Openness of Executive Recruitment (xropen).” This variable measures “the extent
that the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position
through a regularized process” (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2019). It ranges from 0 to 4, with
4 representing the most open institutions. Second, I use a variable called “Competitiveness
of Executive Recruitment (xrcomp),” which measures “the extent that prevailing modes of
advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates.” This vari-
able ranges from 0 to 3, with 3 representing the most competitive institutions. Since the
hypothesis regarding how the level of political openness should affect each group’s access
to power is based on the persistence of institutions, I compute, for each country-year, the
average for each variable since 1800. Then, I define a dummy variable equal to 1 if, for the
case of the variable xropen, its historical average is equal to 4 (which is very close to the
median, and represents a highly open system), and for the case of the variable (xrcomp), its
historical average is above the median (which represents a highly competitive system).
Table V shows estimates of the same specifications used in columns (4) and (5) of Table
II, but distinguishes between countries with high and low historical levels of openness (Panel
A), and between countries with high and low historical levels of competitiveness (Panel
B). These estimates show that the non-monotonic (inverted-U-shaped) effect of group size
on access to power is stronger in countries with historically high levels of openness and
competitiveness (columns (1) and (2)), and weaker (and almost nonexistent) in countries
that are less open and competitive (columns (3) and (4)). In addition, for countries with
historically low levels of openness and competitiveness, the relationship between group size
on access to power appears to follow a linear and positive pattern (see column (5)). Table VI
explores the robustness of the previous results to the use of lagged values for group size as i)
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independent variables (columns (1) to (3)) and as ii) instruments for the contemporaneous
values (columns (4) to (6)). The robustness results are all consistent with those in Table V.
Importantly, the results in Tables V and VI are consistent with the prediction of the
model proposed in the Section 5. In particular, they show that as we move from high to
low levels of openness, the relationship between group size on access to power passes from
having a marked inverted-U shape to being better described as monotonically increasing. As
mentioned in the last section, this can be explained by a decrease in the costs (to the group
with access to power) associated with not limiting other groups’ access to power.
7 Conclusion
This study examines whether the relative size of ethnic groups within a country affects
the extent to which governments limit these groups’ access to central power. Using data at
the group level in 175 countries from 1946 to 2017, I find evidence of an inverted-U-shaped
relationship between the relative size of groups and their access to central power. This
single-peaked relationship is robust to many alternative specifications, and several robustness
checks suggest that relative size causes access to power. Through a very simple model,
I propose an explanation based on an initial high level of political inequality, and on the
incentives that more powerful groups have to continue limiting other groups’ access to power.
This explanation incorporates essential elements of existing theories about the relationship
between group size and political and social exclusion, and leads to a new empirical prediction:
the single-peaked pattern should be weaker in countries where political institutions have been
less open in the past. This additional prediction is supported by the data.
Several opportunities exist for future research. One could examine the effect of ethnic
groups’ relative size on other — more de facto — forms of political participation, such as the
formation of political organizations and participation in protests. It would also be interesting
to examine whether other kind of institutions matter (e.g. less formal political institutions
and cultural institutions). Finally, there is a question of whether individuals in dominant
groups actually agree that the institutions that their groups control limit access to the power
of minority groups.
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Graphs and Tables
Figure I: Scatter plot of relative size and access to central power
The figure plots a measure of the size of each ethnic group on the x-axis against each group’s access to power
score — as defined in Table I — on the y-axis. Each point represents a group over a 10-year period. The
quadratic curve that is overlaid is reported in column (1) of Table II.
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Table II: Relative size and access to central power
Dep. variable: Level of access to central power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative size 1.676∗∗∗ 1.672∗∗∗ 1.672∗∗∗ 1.684∗∗∗ 1.683∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.334) (0.334) (0.332) (0.332)
Relative size squared -1.782∗∗∗ -1.778∗∗∗ -1.778∗∗∗ -1.790∗∗∗ -1.789∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.350) (0.350) (0.348) (0.348)
Joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vertex 0.470 0.470 0.470 0.470 0.470
R-squared 0.058 0.062 0.064 0.071 0.072
Observations 836462 836462 836462 836462 836462
Country fixed effects N Y Y Y Y
10-year period fixed effects N Y Y Y Y
Country/period fixed effects N N Y Y Y
Group fixed effects N N N Y Y
Group-specific linear trends N N N N Y
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates for estimates from Eq (1). The dependent variable
in all columns is each ethnic group’s access to power score (as defined in Table I). The sample
is limited to groups with a score of 2 or less, and the index is averaged over a 10-year period.
In this subsample, the average relative size is 0.117 (with s.d. 0.224) and the average level
of access to central power is 1.036 (with s.d. 0.575). Robust standard errors clustered by
country are in parentheses. * denotes results are statistically significant at the 10% level,
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Table III: Relative size and access to central power (robustness to alternatives
measures of access to central power)
Dep. variable: Access to central power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Using first ob. within each 10-year period
Relative size 1.650∗∗∗ 1.646∗∗∗ 1.645∗∗∗ 1.658∗∗∗ 1.658∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.329) (0.328) (0.326) (0.327)
Relative size squared -1.762∗∗∗ -1.759∗∗∗ -1.758∗∗∗ -1.770∗∗∗ -1.770∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.346) (0.346) (0.344) (0.344)
Joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vertex 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.468
R-squared 0.052 0.055 0.059 0.065 0.066
Observations 821832 821832 821832 821832 821832
Panel B: Using averages over 5-year periods
Relative size 1.642∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗∗ 1.637∗∗∗ 1.650∗∗∗ 1.649∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.341) (0.341) (0.339) (0.339)
Relative size squared -1.746∗∗∗ -1.742∗∗∗ -1.741∗∗∗ -1.754∗∗∗ -1.753∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.358) (0.358) (0.356) (0.356)
Joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vertex 0.470 0.470 0.470 0.470 0.470
R-squared 0.054 0.058 0.060 0.067 0.068
Observations 1568532 1568532 1568532 1568532 1568532
Panel C: Dep. var. is prob. of access to power
Relative size 3.083∗∗∗ 3.078∗∗∗ 3.077∗∗∗ 3.086∗∗∗ 3.086∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.277) (0.277) (0.276) (0.276)
Relative size squared -3.197∗∗∗ -3.191∗∗∗ -3.190∗∗∗ -3.199∗∗∗ -3.199∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.289) (0.289) (0.288) (0.288)
Joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vertex 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482
R-squared 0.305 0.308 0.310 0.312 0.313
Observations 836462 836462 836462 836462 836462
Country fixed effects N Y Y Y Y
Period fixed effects N Y Y Y Y
Country/period fixed effects N N Y Y Y
Group fixed effects N N N Y Y
Group-specific linear trends N N N N Y
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates for estimates from Eq (1). The dependent variable in
all columns is based on ethnic group’s access to power score (as defined in Table I). The sample is
limited to groups with a score of 2 or less. Panel A uses 10-year panel, but rather than averaging
the 10-year data, it takes one observation within each sub-period (e.g one every tenth year). In
this sample, the average relative size is 0.121 (with s.d. 0.228) and the average level of access to
power is 1.023 (with s.d. 0.609). Panel B uses a 5-year panel. In this sample, the average relative
size is 0.118 (with s.d. 0.226) and the average level of access to power is 1.030 (with s.d. 0.586).
Panel C uses 10-year panel and a dichotomous measure of access to power which is equal to one if
the group is not excluded from central power and zero if it is excluded. In this sample, the average
probability of not being excluded from central power is 0.216 (with s.d. 0.411). Robust standard
errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * denotes results are statistically significant at
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.17
Table IV: Relative size and access to central power (robustness to the use lagged
size, IV and control for presence of each group in other countries)
Dep. variable: Level of access to central power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:
Lagged effect IV
Relative size 1.700∗∗∗ 1.711∗∗∗ 1.710∗∗∗ 1.706∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗
(0.339) (0.337) (0.337) (0.340) (0.338)
Relative size squared -1.802∗∗∗ -1.813∗∗∗ -1.812∗∗∗ -1.809∗∗∗ -1.819∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.353) (0.353) (0.355) (0.353)
Joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vertex 0.472 0.472 0.472 0.472 0.472
R-squared 0.066 0.072 0.073 0.067 0.073
Observations 835698 835698 835698 835698 835698
Country and period fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Country/period fixed effects Y Y Y N Y
Group fixed effects N Y Y N N
Group-specific linear trends N N Y N N
Panel B:
Baseline specification Lagged IV
Relative size 1.679∗∗∗ 1.684∗∗∗ 1.683∗∗∗ 1.706∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗
(0.333) (0.331) (0.332) (0.338) (0.337)
Relative size squared -1.784∗∗∗ -1.789∗∗∗ -1.789∗∗∗ -1.808∗∗∗ -1.820∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.348) (0.348) (0.354) (0.353)
Countries with group -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vertex 0.470 0.470 0.470 0.472 0.472
R-squared 0.066 0.073 0.073 0.069 0.075
Observations 715390 715390 715390 621845 621845
Country/period fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Group fixed effects N Y Y N N
Group-specific linear trends N N Y N N
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates for estimates from Eq (1). The dependent variable in all
columns is each ethnic group’s access to power score (as defined in Table I). The sample is limited to
groups with a score of 2 or less, and the index is averaged over a 10-year period. In this subsample,
the average relative size is 0.117 (with s.d. 0.224) and the average level of access to central power is
1.036 (with s.d. 0.575). Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * denotes
results are statistically significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Figure II: Relative size and access to central power by level of political openness
(a) High degree of openness (b) Low degree of openness
The figures plot a measure of the size of each ethnic group on the x-axis against each group’s access
to power score on the y-axis, by historical level of political openness (i.e. PolityIV’s measure
of Openness of Executive Recruitment, computed since 1800). Each point represents a group
over a 10-year period. Figure (a) includes countries with an above-median level of historical
political openness, and Figure (b) includes countries with a below-median level of historical political
openness.
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Figure III: Relative size and access to central power by level of political competitiveness
(a) High degree of competitiveness (b) Low degree of competitiveness
The figures plot a measure of the size of each ethnic group on the x-axis against each group’s access
to power score on the y-axis, by historical level of political competitiveness (i.e. PolityIV’s measure
of Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, computed since 1800). Each point represents a
group over a 10-year period. Figure (a) includes countries with an above-median level of historical
political competitiveness, and Figure (b) includes countries with a below-median level of historical
political competitiveness.
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Table V: Relative size and access to central power by level of political openness
and political competitiveness
Dep. variable: Level of access to central power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: By openness of executive recruitment
High degree of openness Low degree of openness
(avg. xropen=4) (avg. xropen<4)
Relative size 3.221∗∗∗ 3.226∗∗∗ 0.570† 0.572† 0.094
(0.519) (0.519) (0.373) (0.373) (0.070)
Relative size squared -3.413∗∗∗ -3.415∗∗∗ -0.600† -0.602†
(0.548) (0.548) (0.391) (0.390)
Joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.311 0.307
Vertex 0.472 0.472 0.475 0.475
R-squared 0.196 0.199 0.026 0.030 0.024
Observations 295378 295378 350509 350509 350509
Panel B: By competitiveness of executive recruitment
High degree of competitiveness Low degree of competitiveness
(avg. xrcomp above median) (avg. xrcomp below median)
Relative size 2.334∗∗∗ 2.334∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗ 1.104∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.501) (0.502) (0.432) (0.432) (0.098)
Relative size squared -2.458∗∗∗ -2.458∗∗∗ -1.150∗∗ -1.151∗∗
(0.514) (0.515) (0.463) (0.462)
Joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.031
Vertex 0.475 0.475 0.479 0.480
R-squared 0.114 0.116 0.045 0.048 0.029
Observations 513227 513227 323235 323235 323235
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Period fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Country/period fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Group fixed effects N Y N Y Y
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates for estimates from Eq (1). The dependent variable in all columns is
each ethnic group’s access to power score (as defined in Table I). The sample is limited to groups with a score
of 2 or less, and the index is averaged over a 10-year period. In this subsample, the average relative size is 0.117
(with s.d. 0.224) and the average level of access to central power is 1.036 (with s.d. 0.575). Columns (1) and
(2) in Panel A include countries with an above-median level of historical political openness, and Columns (3)
to (5) in Panel A include countries with a below-median level of historical political openness (i.e. PolityIV’s
measure of Openness of Executive Recruitment, computed since 1800). Columns (1) and (2) in Panel B include
countries with an above-median level of historical political competitiveness, and Columns (3) to (5) in Panel B
include countries with a below-median level of historical political competitiveness (i.e. PolityIV’s measure of
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, computed since 1800). Robust standard errors clustered by country
are in parentheses. † denotes results are statistically significant at the 15% level, * at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Table VI: Relative size and access to central power by level of political openness
and political competitiveness (lagged size and IV)
Dep. variable: Level of access to state power
Lagged effect IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: By openness of executive recruitment
High openness Low openness High openness Low openness
Relative size 3.461∗∗∗ 0.642∗ 0.098 3.472∗∗∗ 0.624∗ 0.096
(0.557) (0.374) (0.072) (0.569) (0.376) (0.072)
Relative size squared -3.636∗∗∗ -0.685∗ -3.650∗∗∗ -0.666∗
(0.586) (0.392) (0.598) (0.393)
Joint significance 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.224
Vertex 0.476 0.469 0.476 0.469
R-squared 0.216 0.027 0.019 0.209 0.015 0.008
Observations 294949 350220 350220 294949 350220 350220
Panel B: By competitiveness of executive recruitment
High compet. Low compet. High compet. Low compet.
Relative size 2.334∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗ 2.333∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗
(0.511) (0.439) (0.105) (0.517) (0.442) (0.105)
Relative size squared -2.448∗∗∗ -1.229∗∗ -2.448∗∗∗ -1.226∗∗∗
(0.524) (0.469) (0.530) (0.473)
Joint significance 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.029
Vertex 0.477 0.477 0.477 0.475
R-squared 0.115 0.046 0.025 0.108 0.038 0.016
Observations 512876 322822 322822 512876 322822 322822
Country/period fixed effects Y Y Y Y N Y
Group fixed effects N N Y Y N N
Group-specific linear trends N N N Y N N
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates for estimates from Eq (1). The dependent variable in all columns
is each ethnic group’s access to power score (as defined in Table I). The sample is limited to groups with a
score of 2 or less, and the index is averaged over a 10-year period. In this subsample, the average relative
size is 0.117 (with s.d. 0.224) and the average level of access to central power is 1.036 (with s.d. 0.575).
Columns (1) and (2) in Panel A include countries with an above-median level of historical political openness,
and Columns (3) to (5) in Panel A include countries with a below-median level of historical political openness
(i.e. PolityIV’s measure of Openness of Executive Recruitment, computed since 1800). Columns (1) and (2)
in Panel B include countries with an above-median level of historical political competitiveness, and Columns
(3) to (5) in Panel B include countries with a below-median level of historical political competitiveness (i.e.
PolityIV’s measure of Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, computed since 1800). Robust standard
errors clustered by country are in parentheses. † denotes results are statistically significant at the 15% level,
* at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
22
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. I show that the relationship between the chance that (8) is satisfied and
δ follows an inverted-U pattern. First, I define the function f(δ) as
f(δ) = 1− (1− δ + a1)(1 + a1)
(1− λδ)
(1− δ) . (11)
Note that (8) is satisfied if and only if f(δ) > 0. Thus, to show that the chance that f(δ) > 0 is
satisfied follows an inverted-U pattern, I do the following: i) I show that there exists a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
such that f(δ) is strictly increasing for all δ < δ∗, and strictly decreasing for all δ > δ∗; ii) I show
that f(δ) > 0 for intermediate values of δ, and f(δ) ≤ 0 for sufficiently small or large values of δ.
Figure 4 illustrates the function f(δ).
Figure 4: Parameters and outcomes (λ = 0.5, a1 = 0.1)
Note that f(δ) is differentiable within the interval (0, 1). Thus, differentiating f(δ) with respect
to δ, and rearranging, we have that
f ′(δ) = − 1(1 + a1)
(
a1 − λ(1 + a1) + 2λδ − λδ2
(1− δ)2
)
. (12)
Differentiating again and rearranging, we get
f ′′(δ) = − 2a1(1− λ)(1 + a1)(1− δ)3 . (13)
From the last expression, note that for λ, δ ∈ (0, 1) and a1 > 0, f ′′(δ) < 0, which implies that
f(δ) is strictly concave within the interval (0, 1). Thus, f(δ) has a unique global maximum in this
interval. Let δ∗ be this maximum, and note that since f(δ) is strictly concave, δ∗ is determined by
the first-order condition f ′(δ∗) = 0, i.e., by
− 1(1 + a1)
(
a1 − λ(1 + a1) + 2λδ∗ − λ(δ∗)2
(1− δ∗)2
)
= 0 (14)
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which is satisfied if and only if
λ(δ∗)2 − 2λδ∗ − a1 + λ(1 + a1) = 0. (15)
Now note that there is a unique δ∗ ≤ 1 that solves the last equation. It is easy to see that δ∗ is
given by
δ∗ = 1−
√
a1λ(1− λ)
λ
. (16)
Finally, note that δ∗ > 0 when
λ/(1− λ) > a1 (17)
which I assume in (6). Thus, there is a unique δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that f(δ) is increasing for all
δ ∈ (0, δ∗) and decreasing for all δ ∈ (δ∗, 1). This implies that f(δ) follows an inverted-U pattern
within the interval (0, 1). To verify that f(δ) > 0 for intermediate values of δ, first note that f(δ)
crosses the x-axis twice within the interval [0, 1). To see this, note that f(δ) = 0 when
1− (1− δ + a1)(1 + a1)
(1− λδ)
(1− δ) = 0 (18)
which, rearranging, is equivalent to
δ
(
a1 − (1 + a1)λ+ λδ
)
= 0. (19)
From the last expression, note that there are two different values for δ, which I denote by δ and δ,
such that f(δ) = f(δ) = 0 and 0 ≤ δ < δ < 1. In particular, note that δ = 0 and δ = 1−a1(1−λ)/λ,
and that δ < δ holds because of assumption (6). Given that f(δ) is strictly concave, this implies
that f(δ) > 0 for all δ ∈ (δ, δ), which shows that f(δ) > 0 for intermediate values of δ.
Finally, to see that f(δ) ≤ 0 for δ sufficiently small or sufficiently big, first note that f(0) = 0.
As for the case in which δ is sufficiently big, note that f(δ) < 0 for all δ ∈ (δ, 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. I follow the proof or Prop. 1. First, I define the function h(δ) as
h(δ) = γ + (1− γ)(1− δ) −
(1− δ + a1)
(1 + a1)
(1− λδ)
(1− δ) . (20)
Note that (10) is satisfied if and only if h(δ) > 0. The purpose of the proof is to show that there
is a γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that for all γ > γ∗, Prop. 1 applies, and for all γ < γ∗, the function h(δ) is
strictly convex, strictly increasing and crosses the x-axis at δ = 0. This implies that when γ < γ∗
(i.e. when political institutions are sufficiently persistent), the larger the relative size of a group,
the more likely it is that the group will be given access to power. Figure 5 is the same as Figure 4,
but with different values of γ. It also helps to understand what motivates Prop. 2: as γ decreases,
it becomes more likely that group 2 is given access to power when δ s sufficiently big. Repeating
the analysis in the proof of Prop. 1, note that h(δ) is differentiable within the interval (0, 1). Thus,
differentiating h(δ) with respect to δ, and rearranging, we have that
h′(δ) = 1(1− δ)2
[
(1− γ)− 1(1 + a1)
(
a1 − λ(1 + a1) + 2λδ − λδ2
)]
. (21)
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Figure 5: Parameters and outcomes (λ = 0.5, a1 = 0.1)
Differentiating again, and rearranging, we get
h′′(δ) = 2(1− δ)3
[
(1− γ)− a1(1− λ)(1 + a1)
]
. (22)
Importantly, note that h′′(δ) ≷ for δ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if
1 + λa1
(1 + a1)
≶ γ. (23)
Now define γ∗ = 1+λa1(1+a1) , and note that h′′(δ) < 0 for all γ > γ∗ (i.e. h(δ) is strictly concave), and
h′′(δ) > 0 for all γ < γ∗ (i.e. h(δ) is strictly convex).
Finally, I show that h(δ) is strictly increasing for all γ < γ∗ (and when δ ∈ (0, 1)). To see this,
note from (21) that the condition h′(δ) > 0 is equivalent to
(1 + a1λ)
(1 + a1)
+ λ(1− δ)
2
(1 + a1)
> γ. (24)
And given the definition of γ∗, the last condition is equivalent to
γ∗ + λ(1− δ)
2
(1 + a1)
> γ. (25)
Thus, for all γ < γ∗, the last condition is satisfied.
Finally, note that h(0) = 0, and
h′(0) = 1− γ + λ− a1(1 + a1) (26)
which is strictly positive given (6). This implies that h(δ) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0, 1). So, when γ is
sufficiently small (such that γ < γ∗), we have that h(δ) is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and
h(δ) > 0. This shows that when institutions are sufficiently undemocratic, there is no longer an
inverted-U-shaped relationship between a group’s relative size and its access to power.
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